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Background and Related Research 
Since the early years of modern social scientific 
research, investigators have recognized the importance of 
interpersonal communication and its relationship to the area 
of group process research. A major emphasis in this body of 
research has been placed on pressure for uniformity in groups. 
Several experimental studies have demonstrated that individual 
psychological processes are subject to social influences (Asch, 
1951; Sherif, 1935). The majority of this research examines the 
individual's conformity to group norms. The level of discrepancy 
of conflicting opinions in small group communications ~as been 
examined in a number of experiments (Schachter, 1951; Sherif, 
1935). Previous small group research indicates that during 
interaction the most deviant members tend to gravitate toward 
the group norm (Schachter, 1951). Sherif (1935) found that 
individuals who initially hold more extreme positions in 
relation to group norms tend to exhibit the greatest change. 
Asch (1953} quantified the effects of group pressure by · 
varying the degree of group pressure upon a deviant minority. 
The findings indicate that a unanimous majority, even if 
incorrect in its decision, will have a powerful influence on 
a lone dissenter. This research also shows that beyond the 
number three, increasing the size of the majority has little 
effect in increasing its power to convert the deviant. In 
contrast, providing an ally to the minority greatly increases 
his resistence to persuasion by the majority (Asch, 1953; 
Rosenberg, 1961). Asch (1953) also found evidence that 
individuals differ significantly in regard to the degree of 
yielding to group pressure. Tuddenham's (1955) findings are 
in fundamental agreement with those of Asch (1953) and 
Crutchfield (1955) that at least some people will report 
personal judgments which are profoundly inaccurate, provided 
they are informed that others are making the same judgments. 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) found that group pressure 
effects are even more striking in situations where individual 
group members are faced with a common task requiring 
cooperative effort for the most effective solution. In such 
cases the collection of individuals become interdependent on 
each other. 
In his review of research relating to small group 
processes, Hare (1962) observed that some type of social 
control is necessary if individuals are to carry out 
concerted action and thus function as a group. Social 
control was defined as the process by which the individual 
manipulates the behavior of others or by which group 
members bring pressure on the individual. 
This pressure must be exerted by means of communication 
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among group members (Festinger, 1950). Schachter (1950) 
found that the group as a whole directed more communications 
toward the group member whose opinion deviated most from the 
group norm opinion in an attempt to bring him more in line 
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with the group. Given the presence of a deviate, Emerson {1950) 
observed three ways to restore uniformity to the group; (a) by 
exerting pressure upon the deviate, such that he changes his 
position on the issue, (b) by rejecting him and thereby reducing 
the pressure to interact with him, and (c) by changing the group 
norm in the direction of the deviate. This proposition is in 
direct support of Schachter (1950). 
Festinger (1950) examined the sources of pressures toward 
conformity in groups. Festinger (1950) observed two main 
sources which induce deviants to conform to group norms: (a) 
social reality and (b) group locomotion. Social reality refers 
to personal opinions, attitudes, and beliefs based on 
individual experiences. Therefore if a difference in social 
reality exists among group members, forces to interact will 
arise. The less 11 physical reality 11 available to substantiate 
the opinion, attitude, or belief, the greater will be the 
importance of the social referent, the group (Festinger, 1950). 
Group locomotion represents the pressures toward uniformity 
which arise because they are desirable or necessary in order 
for the group to move toward some goal. Forces to locomote 
may stem from the attractiveness of activities associated 
with a different position in the group or from the status of 
that position (Festinger, 1950). 
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Tuddenham, McBride, and Zahn (1958} found that yielding 
to a norm is influenced by beliefs about the competence of 
those who generate that norm. This research directly supports 
Mausner•s (1953) findings that the prestige of an individual 
group member may be strengthened when that group member gives 
specific evidence of competence in the kind of judgment being 
made and weakened where evidence of incompetence is presented. 
These findings are further supported by Morris and Hackman 
(1969) in that a participant's views are dismissed by the 
group when other members give negative comments in reaction to 
his contributions or when his contributions are 
counterproductive. 
Other investigators found that the degree of yielding by 
the deviate can be affected by factors such as prior 
reinforcement of the responses (Kelman, 1950; Mausner, 1950; 
Mausner, 1954), by a variation in the psychological method 
employed (Mausner, 1952), and characteristics of the group 
and group members (Mausner~ 1953). 
Although controlled research involving small group 
behavior has been of empirical interest since the early part 
of the twentieth century, little of the research has been 
focused on the American jury. Recently, however, the jury has 
become the subject of an increasing amount of research among 
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sociologists, psychologists, and other investigators interested 
in behavioral science research (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Pabst, 
1973; Snortun, Klein, and Sherman, 1976; Strawn and Buchanan, 
1976; Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins 1957; Valenti and Downing, 
1975). These researchers have yielded a significant body of 
factual data that documents the existence of various 
interactional influences affecting juridic judgment. 
Several experimental studies have concluded that certain 
psychological elements such as order of presentation of 
arguments (Weld and Roff, 1938; Lawson, 1967), or of witnesses 
(Weld and Danzig, 1940) can affect jury decisions, even when 
there is major dissenting evidence (Hovland, Janis, and Kel1y, 
1957). Other studies have determined that the apparent self-
confidence of a witness may have a greater impact on a jury 
than the logic of his testimony (Marston, 1924) and that the 
prestige of counsel may be influential (Weld and Danzig, 1940). 
Strawn, Taylor, Pryor, and Buchanan (1976) reported evidence 
that juror's predisposition toward laws affects jury verdicts. 
Several experimental studies have investigated the role 
of social status in jury deliberations. Strodtbeck, James, 
and Hawkins (1957) found that participation in the 
deliberation process is high1y related to occupational status, 
and persons with high status occupations are most frequently 
chosen as foreman. High status persons also tend to sit at 
the head of the table, a position which is independently 
related to high participation and to being picked as foreman 
(Strodtbeck and Hook, 1961). 
Numerous reviews have continued to focus on the effects 
of extralegal influences in judicial processes (Efran, 1974; 
Erlanger, 1970; Friend and Vinson, 1974; Gerbasi, Zuckerman, 
6 
and Reis, 1976). Shoemaker, South, and Lowe (1974) reported 
that jurors have preconceived notions about the physical 
appearance of people who commit certain crimes. Sigall and 
OstrQve (1975) pursued this line of investigation by studying 
the effects of offender attractiveness and nature of the 
crime on juridic decisions. Their findings suggest that 
physical attractiveness and type of offense interact to affect 
sentence severity. More specifically, when an individual 
utilizes his appearance for illicit ends and his physical 
attractiveness is positively related to the successful 
enactment of the offense, such as a swindle, the defendant 
is viewed as more dangerous and consequently the severity of 
his sentence is greater. The opposite finding occured for an 
attractive-unrelated crime such as burglary. The research of 
Jacobson and Berger (1974) suggests that physical attractiveness 
and repentent behavior by the defendant also interact in the 
process of juridic judgment. More specifically a person with 
an attractive physical appearance who displays repentent 
behavior during the course of a trial will receive a lighter 
sentence than an attractive defendant displaying non-repentent 
behavior. Finally, Efran (1974) found that attractive 
7 
defendants of either sex received ratings indicating less 
certainty of guilt, milder punishment, and increased attraction 
in comparison to their unattractive counterparts. 
These studies demonstrate the importance of physical 
attractiveness on juridic judgment. The findings indicate 
that the interaction of many offender characteristics have a 
direct effect on juridic decisions. 
Jury size became a prominent source of investigation when 
a divided Supreme Court (1970) declared that the United States 
constitution does not require juries to be composed of twelve 
members except in capital or eminent domain cases. Concerned 
with crowded judicial calendars, proponents of the smaller 
jury hailed the decision as a positive step toward streamlining 
the overburdened and cumbersome process. Surprisingly, two 
recent field investigations (Beiser and Varrin, 1975; Pabst, 
1973) found that the anticipated savings in time and expense 
for six member juries were negligible. 
Other investigators have expressed reservations about a 
reduction in jury size, fearing that this could confine the 
extent of deliberations and threaten the quality of justice 
(Beiser and Varrin, 1975; Pabst, 1973; Snortum, Klein, and 
Sherman, 1976; Valenti and Downing, 1974; Zeisel, 1972). The 
Supreme Court, however, cited six empirical studies in defense 
of their ruling that juries composed of six members are 
functionally equivalent. The Court•s position was recently 
reinforced by two field investigations (Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 1972; Mills, 1973) and one laboratory 
investigation (Kessler, 1973) which found no significant 
difference between six- and twelve-member juries in the ratio 
of judgments favoring the defense or the prosecution. 
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However, the small group communication research literature 
contains evidence pertaining to the effects of group size on a 
number of dependent measures. Simmel {1950) found that group 
size is a significant determing factor in group interaction. 
Smaller groups are less likely to break into factions (Hare, 
1952), more likely to allow for the maintenance of one-to-one 
relationships (Hare, 1952); and have more equal rates of 
participation by individuals within the group (Bales, 1970). 
Therefore, smaller groups are more satisfied with the group 
discussion, regardless of the final group decision (Hare, 1952). 
At the same time, the smaller group provides fewer resources 
and perspectives for determining a just verdict. Hare (1952) 
also noted that the amount of consensus resulting from group 
discussion decreases as the number of participants increases. 
Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found that few juries are unanimous 
initially. Davis (1973) demonstrated that consensus on jury 
verdicts increases with deliberation. By the requirement 
that the verdict be unanimous, members must control the use of 
their primary group resource, their common time together. Equal 
and responsible participation in the deliberation process is 
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an institutionalized expectation. There is particular concern 
that smaller juries might be more susceptible to intimidation 
by one or two dominant members (Snortum, Klein, and Sherman, 
1976). 
Previous research in small groups indicates that rate of 
participation by an individual in leaderless groups can have a 
powerful influence on group decisions (Bales, 1953; Ginter and 
Lindskold, 1975; Jaffee and Lucas, 1969; Norfleet, 1948; 
Rieken, 1958; Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, 1957). Bales 
(1953) found a tendency for the member with the greatest rate 
of participation to be credited by his fellow members with 
having contributed most in the completion of the task. Jaffee 
and Lucas (1969) have also shown that the rate of participation 
by a group member is more influential in the selection of him as 
a leader than is the correctness of his contribution. 
The present study was designed to assess the susceptibility 
of six-member juries to persuasive influence by an aggressive 
and biased member and to obtain the reactions of those jurors to 
the deliberation process when an aggressive and biased member is 
present. 
Based on the research findings of Bales (1953), Jaffee and 
Lucas (1969), and Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957) one 
might expect an aggressive and biased member to have a 
significant persuasive effect on the jury•s final verdict. 
However, it seems equally possible that a negative effect might 
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result if the aggressive and biased member interferes with the 
participation of others in the group (Hare, 1952) or if other 
group members give negative comments in reaction to his 
contributions (Morris and Hackman, 1969). Thus a research 
question was devised to ascertain the effects of an aggressive 
and biased member on the final verdict by six-member juries 
when the evidence presented in the case is ambiguous. 
Research Question 
What effect will an aggressive and biased member have on 
the final verdict by six-member juries when the evidence 
presented in the case is ambiguous? 
Based upon the existing body of research it was possible 
to formulate the following predictions. 
Hypotheses 
Hl: The aggressive and biased member will be credited as having 
influenced the group most by fellow members of the group 
(Bales, 1953; Jaffee and Lucas, 1969). 
H2: Juries without the aggressive and biased member will show 
more covert acceptance of the final verdict. The basis 
for this prediction is that individuals in the group 
without the aggressive and biased member should have more 
equal rates of participation in the deliberation process 
( B a 1 e s , 19 70) • 
H3: Juries without the aggressive and biased member will be 
1 1 
more satisfied with participation in the discussion and 
group size than juries where the aggressive member is 
present. Again, this should occur since individual group 
members in juries without the aggressive member will have 
more equal rates of participation (Bales, 1970). 
H4: Juries without the aggressive and biased member will 
perceive a greater freedom to express personal and 
divergent opinions than juries where the aggressive and 
biased member is present. This is based on findings by 
Snortum, Klein, and Sherman (1976) who show that aggressive 
or dominant members intimidate others within the group 
thus confining the extent of deliberations. 
HS: Juries without the aggressive and biased member will be 
more satisfied with the completeness of the group 
discussion of the facts than juries containing the 
aggressive member. The rationale for this hypothesis 
that more equal rates of participation will occur in the 
non-aggressive condition, allowing greater use of total 
group resources {Hare, 1952). 
Method 
Subjects 
To maximize external validity it is important that wide 
background differences be present within the juror population. 
This is assured by the fact that in Polk County, Florida where 
this experimental research has been conducted, venirepersons 
are selected by a random process from voting registration lists. 
All research subjects in this study were persons who had been 
summoned for jury service during a week of criminal trials. 
After the final jury needed for the week was selected, always 
on a Friday, the remaining venirepersons were ·invited to 
participate in the investigation. Careful explanations were 
given, informing them that their participation in the project 
was completely voluntary and they could not be paid. Subjects 
were then read prepared instructions regarding the experiment. 
A total of 80 subjects participated in the project. The 
subjects participating in all experimental conditions were 
adults, both male and female, residing in the Polk County area. 
All subjects were volunteers who had been released from actual 
venires in Bartow, Florida. 
Procedure 
Upon arriving at the jury assembly building the subjects 
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were addressed by the jury clerk. After roll call, prospective 
jurors were taken to the Hall of Justice for voir dire. After 
the jury was selected, venirepersons not selected were asked to 
return to the jury assembly building, at which time the clerk 
explained to them that their jury service had been completed. 
He then introduced the experimenter who gave a brief 
explanation regarding the research project. The explanation 
was a prepared statement identically given at the outset for 
each released venire tested. The explanation reads: 
Good morning, my name is Bernard Goodwin and 
I am a representative of Florida Technological 
University in Orlando, Florida. I am presently 
working on a Master of Art's degree in Communication 
at the university and am in the process of conducting 
research for my Master•s thesis the topic of which 
concerns juries. For the past six months I have been 
engaged in several studies involving our judicial 
system, through the University and the Honorable 
David U. Strawn of Titusville, Florida. Recently, 
with the help and cooperation of Chief Judge 
John H. Dewell and Circuit Judge Thomas M. Langston 
of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida I have 
initiated my own research regarding the judicial 
system. It is only through the cooperation of men 
such as these and concerned persons like yourself 
that we can better understand and improve our 
judicial system. As Mr. Davis has explained, you 
have completed your jury service and are free to 
leave. If you should decide to participate in the 
study you cannot be paid, however your time and 
cooperation would be greatly appreciated. 
It was necessary for the experimenter to excuse a number of 
potential subjects since the research design necessitated exactly 
five volunteers for each jury. On each occasion, either 5 or 10 
subjects (one or two juries) were randomly selected from the venire. 
Each jury consisted of five subjects plus a confederate who was 
pos1ng as a venireperson. The remaining venirepersons not 
selected for the project were excused. 
At this time the volunteer subjects were given the 
following instructions: 
The study in which you are about to 
participate is one involving juries. You as 
members of a jury will be asked to weigh facts 
presented in a case and to arrive at a group 
decision as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. The case will be presented in 
typewritten form. Please read all the evidence 
before arriving at any conclusions. After you 
have read the evidence you will see a pre-recorded 
videotape of Judge Thomas Langston who will give 
you insturctions governing the laws pertinent to 
this case, you will then deliberate with the other 
members of your group until a unanimous verdict is 
reached. You may deliberate as long as you feel 
is necessary. 
All material previously objected to, and 
found objectionable by the Court, has been 
removed from the evidence sheet. Everything 
you will read will be admissible evidence in 
accordance with the law and may be considered 
by you. I ask you to give the same careful 
attention to this trial as you would any trial 
being tried with live witnesses in your presence. 
This is a criminal case. The defendant is 
charged by information filed in Court on June 3, 
1977, with a violation of the laws relating to 
breaking and entering with intent to commit a 
felony. It is your solemn responsibility to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant 
and your verdict must be based solely on the 
evidence as it is presented to you in this trial. 
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The subjects were then presented with the stimulus material 
which consisted of a typed case summary and evidence sheets. Upon 
receiving the stimulus materials the subjects were given this 
prepared statement: 
Please read the material carefully. Take 
as long as you feel is necessary. When everyone 
has completed the reading the experimenter will 
show a pre-recorded videotape of the judge's 
instructions regarding this case. 
After all subjects had completed the reading they were 
asked to view, with careful attention, the videotaped 
instructions given by Judge Langston. At this time the 
experimenter started the videotape. The instructions were 
the pattern jury instructions for a burglary case taken from 
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the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. The 
judge's instructions were as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen at this stage of the 
proceedings the court has a responsibility of 
giving instructions as to the laws applicable 
in this case. The defendant, of course is 
charged with the crime of burglary. The court 
will instruct in so far as this particular 
offense. 
It is a crime of burglary for any person 
to enter or remain in a structure of another 
with the intent to commit offense therein, unless 
the premises are at the time open to the public 
or that person is licensed or invited to enter 
or remain upon the premises. The essential 
elements of the offense which must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be 
a conviction in this case are as follows: 1) 
the defendant did enter the structure owned by 
Acme Drugs, without the knowledge or consent 
of Acme Drugs, at a time when such structure 
was not open to the public; 2) the defendant 
did not have permission or consent of said 
Acme Drugs or anyone authorized to act for it, 
to enter or remain in the premises at the time; 
and 3) at the time of entering the premises the 
defendant had a fully formed, conscious intent 
to commit the offense of larceny. 
The court would further instruct you that, 
as used in this law, the word structure means any 
building of any kind either temporary or permanent 
which is enclosed and has a roof over it. Further 
the court would instruct that proof of entering a 
structure or conveyance stealthfully and without 
consent of the owner or occupant thereof may justify 
a finding that the entering was done with an intent 
to commit a crime if from all the surrounding facts 
and circumstances the jury is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such intent existed. 
The intent with which an act is done is an 
operation of the mind, and therefore is not always 
capable of direct and positive proof. It may be 
established by circumstantial evidence like facts 
in any other case. 
Further the court would instruct that even 
though an unlawful entering in a structure is 
proved, if the evidence does not establish that 
it was done with intent to commit some crime as 
stated in the information, that is to say in this 
case, the crime of larceny, the defendant must be 
found not guilty. 
The court would further instruct you at this 
point as to circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence is legal evidence and any act to be proved 
may be proved by such evidence. A well-connected 
chain of circumstances is as conclusive in proving 
a crime as is positive evidence. Its value is 
dependent upon its conclusive nature and tendency. 
Circumstantial evidence is governed by the 
following rules: 1) the circumstances themselves 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 2) the 
circumstances must be consistent with guilt and 
inconsistent with innocence: 3) the circumstances 
must be of such a conclusive nature and tendency that 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
of the defendant's guilt. If the circumstances are 
susceptible of two reasonable constructions, one 
indicating guilt and the other innocence, you must 
accept that construction indicating innocence. 
Circumstances which standing alone, are insufficient 
to prove or disprove any fact, may be considered by 
you in weighing direct and positive testimony. 
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The following instructions are usually referred 
to as general instructions as they are applicable not 
only to this case but in all criminal case. The 
court will proceed first with the presumption of 
innocence following by the instructions as to 
reasonable doubt. 
The defendant in every criminal case is presumed 
to be innocent until his guilt is established by the 
evidence to the exclusion of and beyond every 
reasonable doubt. Before the presumption of innocence 
leaves the defendant, every material allegation of the 
information must be proved by the evidence. The 
presumption accompanies and abides with the defendant 
as to each and every material allegation as contained 
in the information, through each stage of the trial 
until it has been overcome by the evidence. If any 
of the material allegations of the information is 
not proved, you must give the defendant the benefit 
of the doubt and find him not guilty. But if you 
find from the evidence that all the material 
allegations of the charge have been proved beyond 
and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt then 
you must find the defendant guilty. 
Now to overcome the presumption of innocence 
of the defendant the law places the burden upon the 
state to prove the defendant is guilty. The law 
does not require the defendant to prove his 
innocence. Accordingly you must assume that the 
defendant is innocent unless you are convinced 
from all the evidence in the case that he is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. You should evaluate the 
evidence admitted in the case and determine innocence 
or guilt of the defendant entirely in accordance with 
these instructions. It is from the evidence introduced 
at this trial and it alone that you are to determine 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the 
defendant may arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence. The test you must use is this, if you have 
a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any charge made 
by the state you should find the defendant not guilty 
as to that charge. If you have no reasonable doubt 
as to the truth of any charge, you should find the 
defendant guilty as to that charge. 
Now as members of the jury you are the sole judges 
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of the weight and the sufficiency of the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 
You should reconcile any conflicts in the evidence 
without imputing untruthfulness to any witness. If 
you can not reconcile any conflicts then it is your 
duty to reject the evidence you find to be unworthy 
of belief and to accept and to rely upon the evidence 
you find to be worthy of belief. 
In determining the believibility of any witness 
and the weight to be given his testimony you may 
properly consider the demeanor of the witness while 
testifying; his frankness or lack of frankness; his 
intelligence; his interest, if any, in the outcome 
of the case; the means and opportunity he had to 
know the facts about which he testified; his ability 
to remember the matters about which he testified; and 
the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the 
light of all the evidence in the case. From these 
and all other facts and circumstances in the evidence, 
you must reach your own independent conclusions and 
in so doing, you should use the same common sense, 
sound judgment, and reason you have and use in everyday 
1 i fe. 
Further the court would advise and instruct that 
the defendant may become a witness and testify in his 
own behalf. An in considering his testimony and the 
weight and credibility which should be given to it, 
you should consider it just as you would the testimony 
of any other witness. Also the court would instruct 
that a witness may be discredited or the weight of 
his testimony may be weakened or destroyed by proof 
that the witness has been convicted of a crime. 
The court would also instruct that you are here 
only to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. So if the evidence convinces you beyond 
every reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant 
you should find him guilty even though you may 
believe one or more other persons are also guilty. 
On the other hand, if there is a reasonable doubt 
as to the guilt of the defendant you should find 
him not guilty. The defendant is not on trial 
for any act or conduct not charged in the 
information and you must consider the evidence 
only as it relates to that charge. 
Nothing I have said in these instructions or 
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at any other time during the trial is any 
intimation whatever as to what verdict I think 
you should find. The verdict is the sole and 
exclusive duty and solemn responsibility of you, 
the jury, and neither the court nor anyone else 
can help you in performing that duty. 
You are to disregard the consequences of 
your verdict. You are empaneled and sworn only 
to find a verdict based upon the law and the 
evidence. You are to consider only the testimony 
which you have heard and the law as given to you by 
the court. You are to lay aside any personal 
feeling you may have in favor of or against the 
defendant, or in favor of or against the state. It 
is only human to have personal feelings or sympathy 
in matters of this kind, but any such personal 
feeling or sympathy has no place in the consideration 
of your verdict. When you have determined the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, you have completely 
fulfilled your solemn obligation under your oath. 
Now ladies and gentlemen as you go to the jury 
room, you will take with you verdict forms which 
have been prepared for your use, wherein you may 
find the defendant guilty as charged in the 
information or not guilty as charged. 
You will first from among your group choose 
one who will serve as foreman. Any verdict you 
reach must be signed by that individual as 
foreman and any verdict reached must be a 
unanimous verdict. 
At this time ladies and gentlemen we will 
ask you to retire to the jury room for 
deliberation of your verdict. 
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A question that often arose before discussion had started 
was what to do if a deadlock occurred. The experimenter's 
standard reply was, 11 Most groups are able to come to some 
decision if those who disagree will restate their reasons, and 
the problem is reread carefully." All subjects were allowed to 
use the typewritten case summary and evidence sheets during the 
deliberation process. Upon leaving the room the experimenter 
placed the prepared verdict form in the center of the oblong 
table around which the subjects were seated and instructed, 
11 At this time you may begin your deliberations ... 
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The juries were completely on their own as the experimenter 
retired from the room. The experimenter was never in the room 
with the subjects except to distribute and collect materials or 
to administer instructions. 
After a verdict was reached {all groups reached uniformity), 
the experimenter accepted the verdict form and asked each group 
member to fill out a postdiscussion questionnaire. Each subject 
was presented with a copy of the questionnaire and a stand-up 
cardboard placard with the identification numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
or 6. The experimenter was careful to note the identification 
number for the confederate. 
After all subjects had completed the questionnaire each 
subject was fully informed of the purpose of the experiment, 
introduced to the confederate, and thanked for their 
participation and interest in the investigation. The 
experimenter then informed each group that it was very important 
for the content of the experiment to be kept secret since a person 
knowing that a confederate is employed might tend not to react 
naturally to the experimental situation. The subjects were 
therefore requested to avoid discussing the experiment with 
others. None of the subjects involved in the investigation 
reported prior awareness of the research project. 
Materials and Instrumentation 
The stimulus case used in the present investigation was 
developed by Officer Joseph Bongiorno, a four-year veteran of 
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the Orlando Police Department, and the experimenter. The 
selection of burglary (commonly referred to as breaking and 
entering) as the particular type of crime used in this project 
was based on information provided by David U. Strawn, Circuit 
Judge for Florida's Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. In an 
experiment conducted by Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor and Strawn (1978) 
it was indicated that the crime of burglary is one of the most 
common crimes brought to trial in the state of Florida. For this 
reason, the crime of burglary was selected for the present 
investigation. 
The case was presented by means of a typed case summary and 
evidence sheets. The case summary was a chronological summary of 
relevant events occuring the morning of the crime. The evidence 
sheets included a list of ten arguments in favor of the defense 
and eleven arguments in favor of the prosecution, with facts for 
the prosecution presented first. 
The case was deliberately designed to be ambiguous, that is, 
evidence presented in the case was equally weighted to support 
both guilt and innocence while conclusive evidence proving one or 
the other was omitted. To assure that the case was ambiguous a 
pilot study was conducted. Persons from released venires, like 
those in the actual experiment, were asked to read the case 
summary and evidence sheets, watch the videotaped instructions, 
and record their individual verdicts without benefit of 
deliberation. Fifty venirepersons participated in the pilot 
study. The individual verdicts were as follows: 20 guilty, 
20 not guilty, and 10 undecided. The pilot data provides strong 
evidence that the case used in this investigation is ambiguous. 
To help maximize internal and external validity a videotape 
was made of the pattern jury instructions for a burglary case 
taken from the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 
Cases. The instructions were given by Thomas M. Langston, 
Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. The 
videotape was recorded by the experimenter in the Hall of 
Justice in Bartow, Florida. The setting was identical to that 
of a real trial. The videotaped instructions were shown to each 
jury before deliberation. 
A postdiscussion questionnaire was designed by the 
experimenter and distributed to each of the experimental 
subjects. The questionnaire is represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Postdiscussion Questionnaire 
1 • Satisfaction with participation in the discussion. 
Very Very 
satisfied unsatisfied 
+j +2" +T 0 :-r -=7 ::} 
2. Extent to which the group allowed the expression of 
divergent opinions. 
Very Very 
satisfied closed 
+3 +2 n - -=1 - -0 -2 -3 
3. Freedom to express personal opinions. 
Very Very 
free closed 
+J +2" +T 0 -:r -=-2"" -=3 
4. Satisfaction with group size. 
Very Very 
satisfied unsatisfied 
+3 +2 +T 0 :,- -=2 :} 
5. Completeness of the group discussion of the facts. 
Very Very 
complete incomplete 
+3 +2 +T 0 :-r -=2 -=3 
6. Agreement with verdict reached. 
Agree 
strongly _____ _ 
Disagree 
strongly 
7. Rank the top three jurists, in order, who participated 
most in the group discussion using identifying placards 
provided by experimenter. 
1 2 3 
8. Rank the top three jurists who were most influential in 
the deliberation process. 
1 2 3 
9. Experimental group number provided by the experimenter. 
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The first six questions were used to obtain the reactions of 
jurors to the deliberation process. More specifically, 
individual jurors were asked to rate on 7-point bipolar scales 
each of the following: satisfaction with participation in the 
group discussion, extent to which the group allowed the expression 
of divergent or personal opinions, satisfaction with group size, 
completeness of the group discussion of the facts, and agreement 
with the verdict reached. 
While the consensual decisions by the group were designed to 
test the public effect of the deliberation process, question six, 
which dealt with degree of agreement with the verdict measured 
individual covert acceptance with the decision. 
Question seven required each member to rank the top three 
jurists who participated most in the group discussion. Question 
eight asked each member to rank the top three jurists who were 
most influential in the deliberation process. These two questions 
provided the information needed for examining possible 
relationships between rate of participation and degree of influence 
in the group. In addition, responses to question seven served as 
a gauge of the perceived aggressiveness of the confederate. 
Question nine was included for subject identification 
purposes. 
Experimental Design 
The present investigation employed a two dimensional factorial 
design. The two independent variables were 1) aggressive 
behavior and non-aggressive behavior of the confederate who 
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2) advocated guilt or innocence of the defendant. A diagrGm of 
the experimental design is presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. 
Confederate•s 
Behavior 
Aggressive 
Non-
Aggressive 
Experimental Design 
Decision Advocated 
Guilty Not Guilty 
n=4 n=4 
n=4 n=4 
The dependent variables were the final verdicts and the 
reaction of jurors to the deliberation process, including 
satisfaction with participation in the discussion, freedom to 
express personal or divergent opinions, satisfaction with group 
size, completeness of the group discussion of the facts, 
agreement with the final verdict, and degree of influence in the 
deliberation process as compared to rate of participation. 
The decision advocated by the confederate actually served as 
a control variable. This facilitated measurement of interaction 
effects with the confederate's behavior on all dependent measures. 
The operationalization of aggressive and non-aggressive 
behavior posed a challenging problem since previous research has 
not manipulated the variable for testing in small group 
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communication. The majority of investigators have focused on 
conditions that help instigate physical aggression or responses 
to physical aggression via electrical shocks (Berkowitz, 1962; 
Epstein and Taylor, 1967). However aggressive behavior may be 
verbal, non-verbal, direct, indirect, immediately gratified or 
delayed, conscious or unconscious (Duncan and Hobson, 1977). Due 
to this complexity some researchers believe the term aggression to 
be inadequate for use in classifying human behaviors (Tedeschi, 
Smith, and Brown, 1974), while others maintain that aggressive 
behavior is not so much a measurable act as it is a label for a 
series of values and behaviors (Duncan and Hobson, 1977; Wurtzel, 
1977). Nevertheless, Duncan and Hobson {1977) found that the 
populace as a whole viewed aggressive behavior in a relatively 
consistent manner. Their findings indicate that self-centered, 
belligerent, loud-mouthed, and self assertive behavior are viewed 
as common characteristics of aggressive behavior. 
It was believed, therefore, that an operationalization of 
aggression using these behavioral characteristics would achieve 
some degree of external validity. In the present study the . 
aggressive behavior was displayed both verbally and nonverbally. 
Often the dialogue used by the confederate in the two conditions 
was quite similar, but the aggressive or non-aggressive meaning 
was clearly transmitted through vocal cues and other nonverbal 
behavior. Since Merabian (1971) and others have shown emotional 
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mean1ng to be largely contingent upon the nonverbal channel this 
approach was believed to effectively distinguish the conditions. 
A total of sixteen juries were included in the study. Each 
jury consisted of five naive participants plus a confederate. The 
confederate was trained to react differently to the deliberation 
process according to the experimental condition, supporting guilt 
or innocence as predetermined by the experimenter. 
Prior to the first experimental deliberation session, one 
female confederate was recruited for use in the study. The 
confederate was similar in background to many of the naive 
participants, in that she was a retired dental receptionist, 
housewife, and mother of two children. The female had 
participated in an earlier study conducted by the investigator 
and was selected due to her availability, reliability, interest 
in the research, and outgoing personality necessary for her role 
in t~e investigation. 
Before the first experimental session the confederate was 
informed of the nature of the investigation, the stimulus case 
being deliberated, and the deviant positions to be maintained. 
Three initial training sessions were conducted, the duration of 
each session was approximately two hours. This training 
consisted of discussions about her role in each of the conditions. 
Careful explanations were given as to the type of behavior to be 
employed and examples of such behavior were presented. Examples 
28 
of aggressive behavior were presented by means of a pre-recorded 
cassette tape. The tape was recorded during a previous pilot 
investigation involving aggressive behavior in six- and twelve-
member juries. Included on the tape were examples of disruptive 
communication techniques and aggressive verbal and vocal behavior 
used by a previous confederate. The tape may be obtained by 
contacting the Department of Communication at Florida Technological 
University. During the sessions tentative problems were discussed 
and possible defenses for her deviant positions suggested. In 
addition to the initial training, the confederate met with the 
investigator for one hour prior to and following the experimental 
deliberations to discuss problems encountered during the 
interaction process. The sessions prior to the deliberations 
allowed the experimenter to inform the confederate as to which 
condition she would be performing and the position to be 
maintained. The sessions prior to the deliberation also provided 
time to review the stimulus case and defenses for her position. 
The postdiscussion sessions allowed the confederate to discuss 
problems arising during the interactional process which were not 
covered in the initial training sessions. 
The confederate was aggressive in eight juries and non-
aggressive in the remaining eight juries. In each condition, the 
confederate advocated guilt in four of the deliberations and 
innocence in the other four. The confederate in both experimental 
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conditions always spoke second and presented a rehearsed 
dialogue of about three minutes. In the non-aggressive 
condition the dialogue was stated mildly and was a simple review 
of the evidence. In the aggressive condition the confederate 
spoke forcefully with emotion. 
If met with differing opinions regarding her vote the 
non-aggressive confederate was to mildly state her reasons for her 
decision. Her nonverbal cues were to be kept to a minimum in an 
effort to remain passive. However in the aggressive condition the 
confederate was to respond vigorously when other members tried to 
counter her opinions. The confederate in this condition was to 
employ blatant nonverbal cues in an effort to show disgust when 
faced with opposing views. Examples of nonverbal cues in the 
aggressive condition consisted of variations in tone of voice, 
increased volume and rate of speech, rolling of the eyes, blatant 
head nods, frowns, the pounding of her fist on the table, etc. 
Following her initial dialogue, the non-aggressive 
confederate was to speak only if spoken to whereas the confederate 
in the aggressive condition was allowed to disrupt and badger any 
juror opposing her view. 
In the case of five dissenting votes, the confederate was 
instructed to change her vote to coincide with that of the other 
five members. If however her opinion was in support of another 
deviate or minority, she was to passively (non-aggressive condition) 
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or actively (aggressive condition) align herself with that 
deviate or minority. She was to remain with the minority until 
the majority changed its opinion or vice versa. If the 
confederate was in support of the majority she was simply to 
repeat arguments by the majority, either aggressively or 
non-aggressively as dictated by her role. 
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Results 
Question seven on the postdiscussion questionnaire dealt 
with the rank ordering of juror participation in the group 
discussion. This was designed to validate the perceived 
aggressiveness of the confederate in the two experimental 
conditions. Results indicate that the aggressive confederate 
participated significantly more than the non-aggressive 
confederate. The aggressive confederate was ranked number one 
eleven times by her fellow jurors whereas the non-aggressive 
confederate was ranked number one only twice, x2(1) = 7.4396, 
p£01. Additionally, the aggressive confederate was ranked 
first or second by 21 jurors as compared to eight for the 
non-aggressive confederate, x2(1) = 9.12412, pl:.01. 
Questionnaire responses (question eight) for hypothesis 
one indicate that the subjects perceived the aggressive 
confederate as significantly more influential than the non-
aggressive confederate. Using the chi square, results showed 
that the aggressive juror was ranked most influential by 17 of 
her fellow jurists whereas the non-aggressive juror was ranked 
first by only three x2(1) = 13.0665, p~.001. Consistent with 
this finding the aggressive confederate was ranked one or two 
by 24 jurists as compared to 7 such rankings for the non-
aggressive confederate, x2(1) = 9.3411, p4C.Ol. 
Questionnaire responses for questions seven and eight 
indicated a strong correlation between rate of participation 
and degree of influence in the group discussion. By comparing 
the rankings of jurors who participated most in the discussion 
with rankings of jurists who were most influential in the 
deliberation process it was possible to correlate rate of 
participation with perceived influence. Ary and Jacobs (1976) 
suggest using the Spearman p for correlating ordinal data. 
Results from the Spearman p indicate a highly significant 
correlation between rate of participation and perceived 
influence regardless of the direction (guilty/not guilty) of 
the participation, Ps = 0.997 and Ps = 0.999 respectively. 
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The results of the research question regarding the effects 
of the aggressive member of the final verdict show the aggressive 
juror achieved the compliance of her associate jurors in six of 
the eight juries (75%) tested, while the non-aggressive 
confederate produced agreement in only two of the eight 
deliberations (25%). The original plan for data analysis was 
to apply the chi square with Yates• correction factor. However, 
according to Downie and Heath (1970), 11 When E values are less 
than five, and especially when they are around 2, even Yates• 
corrections for continuity is not good, and a method known as 
Fischer•s exact method must be used ... Therefore Fischer•s exact 
test was employed in the data analysis for the research question. 
The results of this two-tailed test produced a trend (pL. 13) 
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which suggested the possibility that the aggressive confederate 
was more influential than the non-aggressive confederate in 
regard to the final verdict. 
Results for questions one through six on the postdiscussion 
questionnaire, which contained information concerning the 
discussion participant's reactions to the deliberation process, 
are presented in Table 1. 
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Responses to question six, agreement with verdict reached 
(H2) indicated no significant differences between the aggressive 
conditions, £(1,76) = 0.07. However the guilty/not guilty 
contrast produced significance, [{1,76) = 6.55, p .05, with the 
guilty decisions receiving a significantly higher level of 
individual agreement with the verdict. Of the 18 main and 
interaction effects available from the first six questions only 
the latter result was statistically significant. The interaction 
effect did not approach significance, f(l,76) = 0.67. 
Questionnaire responses for hypothesis three indicated no 
significant difference in satisfaction with participation 
between the aggressive and non-aggressive conditions, £(1,76) = 
0.04. Similarly the guilty/not guilty contrast produced non-
significance, £(1,76) = 0.00. Finally~ a non-significant 
interaction effect was obtained, F(l,76) = 0.98. Questionnaire 
responses for satisfaction with group size (H3) also indicate 
no significant main or interaction effects. 
No support was obtained for hypothesis four which predicted 
that juries without the aggressive and biased member would 
experience a greater freedom to express personal and divergent 
opinions than juries where the aggressive and biased member was 
present. Similarly, hypothesis five, in which subjects were 
expected to rate the non-aggressive conditions higher in 
completeness of discussion of the facts, received no support. 
Discussion 
Research Question 
The major research question considered in this 
investigation concerned the effects of an aggressive and 
biased member on the final verdict by six-member juries when 
the evidence presented is ambiguous. This portion of the 
paper focuses on interpretations of the results, including 
explanations, conclusions, and suggested areas for future 
research. 
A non-significant difference between juries containing 
the aggressive and non-aggressive juror was reported in the 
results section pL.13 (two-tailed test). Even though the 
data indicated non-significance, there was a noticeable 
effect favoring the aggressive condition. That is juries with 
the aggressive confederate tended to exhibit a higher degree 
of susceptibility to influence than subjects in the non-
aggresive condition. In addition, subjects• perceptions of 
degree of participation and influence provide strong evidence 
that the aggressive juror was both highly participative and 
influential. Coupled with the significant positive 
correlations between perceptions of participation and 
influence, the findings are in agreement with the bulk of 
past research on small groups~ which in.dicate that . amount 
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of participation by an individual in leaderless groups has 
a powerful influence on group decisions (Bales, 1953; Ginter 
and Lindskold, 1975; Jaffee and Lucas, 1969; Norfleet, 1948; 
Rieken, 1958: Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, 1957). This 
finding also supports previous findings by Snortun, Klein, and 
Sherman (1976) that six-member juries are highly susceptible 
to intimidation by one or two dominant members. 
In six of the eight deliberations in the aggressive 
condition the confederate successfully manipulated the final 
verdict. Explanations regarding the two juries rejecting the 
confederate•s persuasive influence are of interest. In one of 
the deliberations the group rallied around another highly 
assertive male member who held the position opposite the 
confederate. This observation directly supports findings by 
Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957) which indicate that 
males have higher participation, influence, and perceived 
competence than females for the jury task. In the second 
deliberation where the confederate was unable to dictate 
the final verdict, a black assertive female was present. She 
too opposed the confederate in her support of a not guilty 
plea. It is possible that the female•s race affected the 
final decision. Such racial influence is suggested by 
Rosenthal (1963) in his discussion of reverse bias. That is, 
attempts to be racially unbiased toward the black defendant, 
in the presence of a black juror, may have caused the 
remaining jurors (all white) to unconsciously bias their 
decisions in favor of the black defendant. 
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The present results regarding the research question are 
sufficiently provocative to justify future study on the effects 
of extralegal influences in the deliberation process. More 
specifically, a replication of the present investigation using 
a pre-recorded videotape of a mock trial, including opening and 
closing remarks by the attorneys and testimony of witnesses, 
while controlling for sex and race of the confederate may yield 
worthwhile evidence regarding the effects of an aggressive 
member in jury deliberations. Such extensions of the present 
research design would also help increase the external validity 
of the current findings. 
Hypotheses 
In addition to the research question, five predictions 
based upon the existing body of research were made concerning 
jurors• reactions to the deliberation process. Of the five 
predictions outlined in the first chapter only one was 
supported. 
The results support hypothesis one in that the aggressive 
and biased member was credited as having influenced the group 
most by fellow members. This directly supports findings by 
previous researchers {Bales, 1953; Jaffee and Lucas, 1969; 
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and Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, 1957). This finding gives 
strong evidence to the fact that when an individual member 
displays unyielding confidence in her opinion, others within the 
group perceive competence in the assertive members opinion. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon could be that the 
confederate's continuing association with the case caused her 
to become overly familiar with it and thus caused her to 
unconsciously revert to rational arguments in an attempt to 
persuade the jury, although her training was designed to 
eliminate this problem. Future research may include the use of 
several confederates while substituting equivalent and 
representative cases throughout the study. 
Contrary to expectations hypothesis two, concerning 
individual argreement with the final verdict, was not supported. 
The data presented in Table 1 indicates that the guilty/not 
guilty contrast produced significance, with the guilty decisions, 
receiving a significantly higher level of individual agreement 
with the verdict. However, this is probably best explained as 
a chance finding since only one of eighteen contrasts, .F means 
shown in Table 1, produced significance at the .05 level. 
Hypothesis three which examined satisfaction with partici-
pation in the discussion as a function of group size was also 
unsupported. This finding suggests that equal rates of 
participation are not necessarily determining factors in an 
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individual's personal satisfaction with his participation in 
the deliberation or with an individual's satisfaction with 
group size. It is conceivable that most jurors are satisfied 
with the group size, as indicated by the means in Table 1, 
because jury size is governed by the law. In explaining the 
non-significance between conditions regarding satisfaction with 
participation, one might consider the possibility that most 
juries have one or two aggressive members who dominate the 
discussion. Another plausible explanation for this finding is 
that an individual may consider the aggressive member to be 
competent and therefore feel no need to contribute extensively 
in the discussion. Future research should include a system for 
measuring the exact number of contributions (both verbal and 
nonverbal) for each group member and compare these to his 
individual score on satisfaction with participation in the 
deliberation. 
Hypothesis four was not confirmed. This finding 
contradicts the fears of Snortum, Klein, and Sherman (1976) 
that an aggressive and dominant member will intimidate others 
within the group thus confining the extent of deliberations 
by disallowing the expression of personal and divergent 
opinions. 
Hypothesis five concerning satisfaction with the 
completeness of the group discussion of the facts was not 
confirmed. This finding indicates that equal rates of 
participation are not necessary for group discussion of the 
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facts to be complete. It seems plausible that when an aggressive 
group member displays unyielding confidence in her opinion others 
perceive her contributions as being competent and helpful in 
completion of the task. 
The findings from the present investigation clearly indicate 
that the aggressive member (confederate) took charge of the 
deliberation, effectively manipulated the final verdict, and was 
perceived as active and influential, while the general affect of 
the group was not disturbed. Further, the perceived affective 
climate did not significantly differ between the aggressive and 
non-aggressive conditions. These findings suggest that the 
aggressive person has a special effect on a jury. Jury members 
appear to be quite susceptible to the persuasive appeals of a 
fellow juror who is willing to accept the responsibility for a 
tough decision. The jurors not only conform to the position of 
the aggressive advocate, but are also quite content to reach a 
verdict in this manner. This evidence suggests that trial · 
lawyers would be well advised to select aggressive individuals 
who seem to be favorably disposed to their case. While it is 
possible that an overly aggressive, quasi-logical, juror might 
sometimes cause boomerang effects, the current data suggest 
that this risk is minimal. 
Limitations 
Laboratory studies have many .limitations but they do 
provide opportunities for holding constant some of the 
variables which confound the findings of research in the 
natural setting. By carefully controlling the exp~rimental 
stimulus and then observing the subject•s behavior under 
controlled conditions, laboratory experiments help eliminate 
uncertainty in interpreting results. While this control 
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permits a more direct inference of causal relationship between 
the stimulus content and subsequent behavior, this same control 
results in the use of artificial environments. For this reason, 
some critics may complain that stimulus materials combined with 
artificial settings threaten the external validity of the 
investigation. 
However one of the problems in dealing with social science 
research is the fact that by its very nature, social science is 
placed in the precarious position of attempting to generalize 
about human behavior. But social science research is also based 
on cumulative knowledge gathered via extensive replication of 
previous and related research which can eliminate many of the 
problems associated with the generalization of findings across 
subjects, situations, and operationalizations of the independent 
and dependent variables. Every effort was made to enhance the 
external validity of the experiment through the use of realistic 
procedures, a representative case, subjects selected from actual 
venires, the courtroom setting, and the use of videotaped 
standardized instructions. 
Due to the limits of law, the present investigation was 
necessarily presented to subjects as a simulated jury task 
which may have caused subjects to react differently than if 
they actually believed they were making a decision which 
would dramatically affect the life of a real defendant. 
Another obvious limitation was the lack of funds to support 
the investigation. Since subjects could not be paid for their 
participation in the project only volunteers were used. Some 
critics may suggest that volunteers are not a representative juror 
population because by volunteering the subjects admit an 
interest in the experiment which could affect their 
perfonmance. However, no alternative method of subject 
selection was possible. 
Along the same line one might argue that the confederate 
could bias the juries in subtle ways since she was aware of the 
variable being manipulated in the experiment. Rosenthal (1963) 
suggests personal bias can often be a problem in experimental 
situations. Biasing can be conscious or unconscious when the 
person involved is aware of what the experimenter expects to 
find. To minimize the danger of such biasing, the confederate 
was kept unaware of the research question and experimental 
predictions regarding jurors 1 reactions to the deliberation 
process. 
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The final limitation was that of time. Due to the 
schedule of the investigator, confederate, and the nature of 
the research design only a small population was tested. 
External validity would be more impressive had the investigator 
been able to test 30 or 40 groups rather than just the 16 
reported in this experiment. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The present study was designed to assess the 
susceptibility of six-member juries to persuasive influence 
by an aggressive and biased member and to obtain the 
reactions to the deliberation process when such a member was 
present. 
Eighty volunteers who had been released from actual 
venires in Bartow, Florida participated in the project. 
Volunteer subjects were randomly assigned to juries. Each 
jury consisted of five naive subjects plus a confederate. 
Each jury was given a brief explanation concerning the 
investigation and then presented with a typed case summary 
and evidence sheets. The case used in the present 
investigation was the crime of burglary. The case summary was 
a chronological summary of relevant events occuring the morning 
of the crime. The evidence sheets included both arguments for 
the prosecution and for the defense. The case was deliberately 
designed to be ambiguous. That is, evidence presented in the 
case was equally weighted to support guilt and innocence while 
conclusive evidence proving one or the other was omitted. 
After all subjects had completed the reading they viewed 
a pre-recorded videotape of the pattern jury instructions for 
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a burglary case taken from the Florida Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases as presented by Circuit Judge 
Thomas M. Langston. 
Upon completion of the instructions jurors were asked to 
deliberate the case and to arrive at a unanimous decision 
regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused. During the 
deliberation process the confederate was to support guilt 
or innocence of the defendant as predetermined by the 
experimenter. The 16 juries participating in the study were 
separated into 4 conditions, in a 2x2 factorial design. 
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In the non-aggressive condition the confederate supported 
guilt in four juries and innocence in the remaining four (as 
predetermined by the experimenter) in a non-aggressive manner. 
This was achieved by having the confederate simply review the 
evidence in a low key, unemotional manner while consciously 
limiting her nonverbal cues. In the aggressive condition the 
confederate argued forcefully for guilt in four juries and 
i~nocence in the other four juries (as predetermined by the 
investigator) using disruptive and aggressive communication 
techniques. These techniques included vigorous responses to 
opinions contrary to those of the confederate accompanied by 
blatant nonverbal cues such as the rolling of the eyes, 
increased volume and rate of speech, and flagrant head nods. 
The confederate in both conditions always spoke second and 
presented a rehearsed dialogue of about three minutes. The 
variable was manipulated primarily through differences in 
the manner in which the dialogue was presented, aggressively 
or unagressively. 
Prior to the first experimental deliberation session the 
confederate received initial training regarding her role in 
each of the experimental conditions. During these training 
sessions careful explanations were given as to the type of 
behavior to be employed and examples of such behavior were 
presented. Examples of aggressive behavior were presented 
by means of a pre-recorded cassette tape. The tape was 
recorded during a previous investigation involving aggressive 
behavior in 6- and 12-member juries. Included on the tape 
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were examples of disruptive communication techniques and 
aggressive verbal and vocal behavior used by a previous 
confederate. The tape may be obtained by contacting the 
Department of Communication at Florida Technological University. 
After reaching a unanimous verdict the jurors were 
presented with a postdiscussion questionnaire to obtain their 
reactions to the deliberation process. Following completion 
of the questionnaire the subjects were informed about the 
purpose of the investigation, introduced to the confederate, 
and reque~edto avoid discussion of the experiment with others. 
Consistent with previous research (Snortum, Klein, and 
Sherman, 1976), findings from the present investigation 
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suggest that an aggressive and biased member may have a 
measurable impact on the final decision by six-member juries. 
The current findings also show a high correlation between juror 
rankings of the rate of participation and perceived influence 
of the confederate. 
Contrary to expectations, findings from the postdiscussion 
questionnaire suggest that various reactions of jurors to the 
deliberation process are not significantly affected by an 
aggressive and biased member. More specifically the aggressive 
variable did not produce significant differences regarding 
satisfaction with participation in the discussion, extent to 
which jurors were allowed to express personal and divergent 
opinions, satisfaction with group size, completeness of the 
discussion of the facts, and agreement with verdict reached. 
It is only through the cooperation between social 
scientists and members of the legal profession that we can 
continue to learn about and improve the legal process. Such 
cooperation should allow exploration of many research questions 
which are logical extensions of the current project. For 
example, would the influence of an agg~essive and biased juror 
be affected by jury size, the sex make-up of the jury, level 
of ambiguity of the case, seating positions around the 
deliberation table, and different operationizations of 
aggression. Continued applications of communication research 
and theory to courtroom procedures should provide useful 
resource information for understanding the dynamics of the 
legal system in our changing society. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample of Case Summary and Evidence Sheets 
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CASE SUMMARY 
Victim: Acme Drugs 
Location: Orange Avenue Shopping Center 
Date: May 25, 1977 
Time: 2:00 a.m. 
Predawn (2:00a.m.) 
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1. Silent alarm at police headquarters notifies authorities of 
robbery in progress. 
2. Contact officer proceeds to scene. 
3. Upon arrival, officer hears commotion in rear; proceeds to 
rear of store with weapon drawn. 
4. As the officer rounds the corner of the building he sees 
a black male approximately medium build running from the 
scene. 
5. Officer follows but is unable to apprehend the man before 
he enters a wooded area; while pursuing the suspect the 
officer notices that the man in question has a peculiar 
stride, as if dragging one leg; not knowing if the suspect 
is armed, the officer does not follow but rather returns 
to patrol car to have the area sealed off. 
6. Officer then returns to the crime scene where he is 
joined by two back-up units. 
7. Investigation reveals that the thief entered drugstore 
through rear window by sawing steel bars and breaking 
glass. 
8. A hacksaw with the initials 11 1.0. 11 scratched into the 
plastic handle is found near point of illegal entry. 
9. Further investigation finds pharmaceutical area of store 
in disarray and approximately $200 worth of barbituates 
were found missing from display case which had been 
broken into. 
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10. Also found near the broken case was a recently extinguished 
roll-your-own cigarette butt, another was found near the 
window. 
11. Prints on the hacksaw were smudged so no usable prints 
cound be lifted. 
12. When reconstructing the crime, detectives figured the thief 
tripped the alarm as he was leaving the scene thus 
unknowingly giving himself enough time to flee the scene 
before police officers arrived. 
13. Later the same morning (3:00 a.m.) uniformed police noticed 
a black male watching suspects description limping 
hurriedly along road in a predominantly white 
residential section approximately 10 blocks from crime 
scene. 
14. The uniformed officers stopped and questioned the man who 
was then identified as Isiah Dawkins a recent parolee. 
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15. After further investigation Isiah Dawkins was arrested one 
week later and charged by information with the breaking and 
entering of Acme Drugstore with the intent to commit a 
felony. 
EVIDENCE 
Prosecution: Allegations and proof 
l. Police officer (trained observer) saw man of similar 
race, height, weight. 
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2. Police officer testifies that the man he saw running from 
the scene had a peculiar stride, as if he had a bad leg. 
3. Initials 11 I.D.u scratched in the handle of the hacksaw 
used in the illegal entry are the same as those of the 
defendant. 
4. Pha~acist identifies defendant as being in the pharmacy 
area the afternoon prior to the burglary. 
5. Pharmacist testifies he remembers the defendant because 
of the length of time he wandered aimlessly through the 
pharmaceutical department causing himself (the pharmacist) 
to become suspicious. 
6. The prosecuting attorney insinuates the defendant was 
planning the robbery while in the store. 
7. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the glass display 
case from which the drugs were stolen. 
8. Defendant has no alibi. 
9. Defendant was seen and in fact questioned in general 
vicinity of crime. 
10. Defendant smokes roll-your-own cigarettes similar to 
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those found at the scene of the crime. 
11. Defendant has previous conviction for possession and sale 
of illegal drugs. 
EVIDENCE 
Defense: Denial of Proof 
1. Prosecution can not make a positive I.D. from police 
officer•s description. 
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2. Numerous black males in town match the suspects description. 
3. The defendant has no previous record of breaking and 
entering. 
4. Defense attorney argues that a previous drug conviction 
can in no way incriminate his client in a burglary case. 
He argues that the two are completely unrelated. 
5. Defendant testifies that the hacksaw found at the crime 
scene had belonged to him but it had been stolen from 
his garage several weeks earlier along with some of his 
other tools. 
6. Defense attorney argues that it is not a crime for his 
client to be in a public place (drugstore) and argues 
that it was merely coincidental that his client should 
be in the drugstore the afternoon prior to the robbery. 
7. In regard to his client•s fingerprints on the glass 
display case, again coincidental. Pharmacist admits 
seeing his client in the store, so why is it so unusual 
that his fingerprints sould be in the store. 
8. In response to being seein in vicinity of the crime -
again the defense argues that it is not against the 
law for a black man to walk in a white neighborhood. 
9. Police did not find stolen drugs on Mr. Dawkins. 
10. Defendant admits smoking roll-your-own cigarettes but 
also testifies that many of his friends do too. 
11. Defendant denies burglarizing the Acme Drugstore. 
Guilty Not Guilty Undecided 
57 
References 
Ary, D. & Jacobs, L. C. Introduction to statistics. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, & Uinston, 1976. 
Asch, S. E. Effects of group pressure upon modification 
and distortion of judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), 
Groups, leadership, and men. Pittsburgh: Carnegie 
Press, 1951. 
Asch, S. E. Effects of group pressure upon the modification 
and distortion of judgments. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander 
(Eds. ), Group dynamics. Evanson, Ill.: Row Peterson, 1953. 
Bales, R. F. The equilibrium problem in small groups. In T. 
Parsons, R. F. Bales, & E. A. Shils, Working papers in the 
theory of action. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953. 
Bales, R. F. Personality and interpersonal behavior. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970. 
Beiser, E. & Varrin, R. Six-member juries in the federal courts. 
Judicature, 1975, 58 (9), 424-433. 
Berkowitz, L. Aggression: A social psychological analysis. New 
York: ~1cGraw-Hi 11, 1962. 
Buchanan, R. W., Pryor, A., Taylor, K. P. & Strawn, D. U. Legal 
communication and investigation of comprehension of pattern 
instructions. Communication Quarterly, in press. 
Crutchfield, R. S. Conformity and character. American Psychology, 
1955, lQ, 191-199. 
Davis, J. H. Group decision and social interaction: A theory of 
social decision schemas. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 
97-125. 
58 
Deutsch, M. & Gerard, H. B. A study of normative and 
informational social influences upon individual judgment. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1955, 60, 629-636. 
59 
Downie, N. M. & Heath, R. W. Basic Statistical Methods. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1970. 
Duncan, P. & Hobson, G. N. Toward a definition of aggression. 
Psychological Report, 1977, 1, 545-555. 
Efran, M. G. The effect of physical appearance on the judgment 
of guilt, interpersonal attraction, and severity of 
recommended punishment in a simulated jury task. Journal 
of Research in Personality, 1974, 8, 45-54. 
Emerson, R. M. Deviation and rejection: An experimental 
replication. American Society Review, 1954, 19, 388-693. 
Epstein, S. & Taylor, S. P. Instigation to aggression as a 
function of degree of defeat and perceived aggressive 
intent of the opponent. Journal of Personality, 1967, ~' 
265-289. 
Erlanger, H. Jury research in America: Its past and future. 
Law and Society Review, 1970, ~' 345-370. 
Festinger, L. Informal social communication. Psychological 
Review, 1950, ~' 271-272. 
Friend, R. M. & Vinson, M. Leaning over backwards. Journal of 
Commu~ication, 1974, 24, 124-129. 
Gerbasi, K. C., Zuckerman, M., & Reis, H.T. Justice needs a new 
blindfold: A review of mock jury research. Psychological 
Bulletin, 1976, 84 (2), 323-345. 
Ginter, G. & Lindskold, S. Rate of participation and expertise 
as factors influencing leader choice. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, ~(6), 1085-1089. 
Hare, P. A. A study of interaction and consensus in different 
sized groups. American Sociological Review, 1952, !2_(3), 
261-268. 
Hare, P.A. Handbook of small group research. New York: The 
Free Press, 1962. 
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelly, H. H. 
presentation and persuasion. New Haven: 
Press, 1957. 
60 
The order of 
Y a 1 e Un i ve rs i ty 
Institute of Judicial Administration A comparison of six- and 
twelve-member juries. Trenton, ·New Jersey: IJA, 1972. 
Jacobson, S. & Berger, C. Communication and justice: Defendant 
attributes and their effects on the severity of his sentence. 
Speech Monographs, 1974, il (3), 282-286. 
Jaffee, C. L. & Lucas, R. M. Effects of rates of talking and 
correctness of decisions on the leader choice in small 
groups. The Journal of Social Psychology, 1969, ]2, 247-254. 
Kalven, H. J. & Zeisel, H. The American jury. Boston: 
Little Brown, 1966. 
Kelman, H. Effects of success and failure on 11 Suggestibility 11 
in the autokinetic situation. Abnormal Social Psychologx, 
1950, 45, 267-285. 
Kessler, J. An empirical study of six- and twelve-member jury 
decision-making processes. University of Michigan: Journal 
of Legal Reform, 1973, ~' 671-711. 
Lawson, R. G. Order of presentation as a factor in jury 
persuasion. Kentucky Law Journal, 1968, ~' 524-555. 
Marston, W. M. Studies in testimony. Journal of American 
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1924, ~' 5-31. 
Mausner, B. The effect of variation in psycho-physical methods 
on the interaction of observer pairs. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 1950, 34, 314-378. 
Mausner, B. The effect of pair reinforcement on the interaction 
of observer pairs. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychologx, 
1954, 49, 65-68. 
Mehrabian, A. Nonverbal betrayal of feelings. Journal of 
Experimental Research in Personality, 1971, ~, 64-73. 
Mills, L. R. Six-member and twelve-member juries: An empiricaJ 
study of trial results. University of Michigan: Journal of 
Legal Reform, 1973, 6, 671-711. 
Morris, C. G. & Hackman, J. R. Behavioral correlates of 
perceived leadership. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1969, lJ, 350-361. 
Norfleet, B. Interpersonal relations and group productivity. 
Journal of Social Issues, 1948, i (2), 66-69. 
61 
Pabst, W. R. What do six-member juries really save? Judicature: 
American Judicature Society, 1973, ~' 6-11. 
Riecken, H. W. The effect of talkativeness on ability to 
influence group solutions of problems. Sociometry, 1958, £l, 
309-321. 
Rosenberg, L. A. Group size, prior experience, and conformity. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, §1 (2), 
436-437. 
Rosenthal, R. On the social psychology of the psychological 
experiment: The experimenter's hypothesis as unintended 
determinant of experimental results. American Scientist, 
1963, ~ (2), 268 
Schachter, S. Deviation, rejection, and communication. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 46, 190-207. 
Sherif, M. A. A study of some social factors in perception. 
Archives of Psychology, 1935, ~' 187-253. 
Shoemaker, D. J., South, D. R., & Lowe, J. Facial stereotypes of 
deviants and judgments of guilt or innocence. Social Forces, 
1974, ~' 427-433. 
Sigall, H. & Ostrove, N. Beautiful but dangerous: Effects of 
offender attractiveness and the nature of the crime on 
juridic judgment. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1975, ll (3), 410-414. 
Simmel, G. (The Sociology of George Simmel) (K. H. Wolf trans.) 
Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950. 
Snortum, J. R., Klein, J. S., & Sherman, W. A. The impact of an 
aggressive juror in six- and twelve-member juries. Criminal 
Justice and Behavior, 1976, 3 (3), 255-262 . 
.... 
Strawn, D. U. & Buchanan, R. W. Jury confusion: A threat to 
justice. Judicature, 1976, ~ (10), 478-483. 
62 
Strawn, D. U., Taylor, K. P., Pryor, A., & Buchanan, R. W. Must 
jurors like the law. The Florida Bar Journal, 1976, ~ (10), 
Strodtbeck, F. L. & Hook, L. Social dimensions of a twelve-man 
jury table. Sociometry, 1961, 24, 397-415. 
Tideschi, T. D., Smith, R., & Brown, R. C. A reinterpretation 
of research on aggression. Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 
~ {9), 540-562. 
Tuddenham, R. D. The influence of a distorted group norm upon 
individual judgment. Journal of Psychology, 1958, 40, 
227-241. 
Tuddenham, R. D., McBride, B., & Zahn, V. Studies in conformity 
and yielding. Psychological Review, 1958, 40, 257-289 
Valenti, A. C. & Downing, L. L. Differential effects of jury 
size on verdicts following deliberation as a function of the 
apparent guilt of a defendant. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1975, ]£ (4), 655-663. 
Weld, H. P. & Danzig, E. R. 
is reached by a jury. 
~, 518-628. 
A study of the way in which a verdict 
American Journal of Psychology, 1940, 
Wurtzel, A. Television violence and aggressive behavior. Et 
cetera (Etc.,), 1977, 34 (2), 212-225. 
Zeisel, H. The waning of the American jury. American Bar 
Association Journal, 1972, 58, 367-370. 
